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Abstract: Established at the height of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the 
intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has, potentially, 
considerable influence over decisions on the provision of loans to Eurozone 
member state governments and on the recapitalization of banks. Legally and 
organizationally, the ESM is an international financial institution and thus its 
accountability can be compared to that of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and other international financial institutions. However, the ESM’s 
governance structure and decision-making procedures show that it is deeply 
embedded in the Eurozone governance architecture, resulting in a ‘dual 
institutional embeddedness’. Focusing on vertical and horizontal 
accountability, combined with a learning perspective on accountability, this 
paper presents an assessment of the accountability mechanisms applicable to 
the idiosyncratic ESM and how these mechanisms work in practice. 
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Introduction 
Concerns about limited democratic legitimacy and accountability have bedevilled the European 
Union (EU) alongside its growing competences in different policy areas and its perceived 
intrusiveness in the domestic political arenas of the member states. As Curtin shows (2007, p. 
540), ‘the European “administrative space” has grown phenomenally both in intensity and in 
scope over the course of the past two decades, in a manner that was certainly not predicted by 
the Treaty framers’ (see also Flinders, 2001; Harlow, 2002; Lord, 2004). Similar concerns about 
legitimacy and accountability have been raised about EU agencies (Curtin, 2007; Busuioc, 
2009) and recent institutional additions to the EU governance landscape such as the European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) for the financial sector and the new bodies created as part of 
the recently established Banking Union — notably, the Single Supervisory Board (part of but 
distinct from the European Central Bank) and the Single Resolution Board (Howarth and 
Quaglia, 2014).  
This paper undertakes a critical assessment of the accountability of one recent 
institutional addition to the Eurozone governance system — the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). The ESM formally came into existence on 27 September 2012, supplementing the 
temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) which is to be wound down when the 
last of its obligations are repaid. The ESM is a permanent financial mechanism that can wield 
funds to stabilize Eurozone member states and financial institutions in distress with the broader 
objective of safeguarding financial stability in the Eurozone. Current ESM reform proposals 
demonstrate the potential for the increased importance of the mechanism in EU economic 
governance. The Commission and a number of member states have called for the ESM to 
become the official financial backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), the Eurozone-wide 
bank resolution fund (EUObserver, 11 October 2017). Moreover, the Commission and German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel have called for the ESM to be transformed into a European Monetary 
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Fund (EMF) (Financial Times, 29 August 2017, 6 December 2017, 3 June 2018), although 
Chancellor Merkel has insisted that the mechanism remain a non-EU intergovernmental body. 
From a legal and organisational standpoint, the ESM is an intergovernmental body:  it is 
an international organisation established by an international treaty that was signed by the 
Eurozone member states.2 The ESM’s intergovernmental status is demonstrated most clearly 
by the unanimity that applies to all major decisions and the exclusively national capital 
contributions (Article 4, ESM Treaty; Article 8, ESM Treaty). Regarding Eurozone governance 
in general, Dawson (2015, p. 976) warns that many new structures designed in response to the 
Eurozone crisis ‘depart from the mechanisms of legal and political accountability present in 
previous forms of EU decision-making without substituting new models of accountability in 
their place’. Our aim is to contribute to the growing body of literature on Eurozone governance 
reforms. By examining in greater detail the accountability mechanisms applicable to an 
important new Eurozone body, we identify accountability gaps and shortcomings. As Henning 
(2017, p. 178) has emphasized, ‘the ESM is the first formal, treaty-based institution uniquely 
for the monetary union’. Therefore, this in-depth case study will yield important insights about 
the extent to which good governance principles apply to the EMU architecture reconfigured in 
the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis.  
From a global perspective, there is growing demand for greater accountability with regard 
to a range of international financial organisations. Until the 1980s, bodies such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank focused on rather narrow technical 
missions. Over the past three decades, the IMF and the World Bank have come to perform a 
much wider range of tasks directly affecting the domestic political arenas of their members. 
Many have thus argued that the need for greater accountability of these international financial 
																																								 																				
2 The ESM Treaty is available from: https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/20150203_-
_esm_treaty_-_en.pdf 
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institutions has become more critical (Woods, 2003; Grant and Keohane, 2005). Similarly, the 
ESM provides a financial backstop for distressed Eurozone member states which must comply 
with the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union (the so-called Fiscal Compact) and the specific reform programme to which they have 
committed in order to receive ESM funds. Funding recipients are subject to conditionality 
policies similar to those developed by the IMF at the international level. These conditionality 
policies are agreed by the ESM Board of Governors which consists of Eurozone national 
ministers of finance or their representatives. Operational decisions are taken by the ESM’s 
Board of Directors, consisting of officials ‘of high competence in economic and financial 
matters’, with one member appointed by each of the Eurozone member states. The Managing 
Director of the ESM contributes to the drafting of the financial assistance programme for 
receiving countries (see Articles 5-7, ESM Treaty).3 When an organisation impinges upon state 
sovereignty so visibly, it inevitably faces pressure for greater accountability in order to ensure 
its political legitimacy. 
The second section of this paper discusses relevant accountability benchmarks, drawing 
on the comparative politics, international relations and public administration literatures. 
Subsequently, the third section presents the ESM’s ‘dual institutional embeddedness’ which 
gives rise to unique — what we describe as ‘tricky’ — accountability challenges. The fourth 
section provides an assessment of how vertical and horizontal accountability and learning 
																																								 																				
3 Regulation 472/13 Articles 6 and 7 note that the Member States make a request to the ESM 
to draw up a financial assistance programme for a country (ESM Member). However, the 
Commission, in liaison with the ECB, assesses the sustainability of the ESM Member’s public 
debt and develops a draft macro-economic adjustment programme. This programme in turn 
must be approved by the Council. The ESM’s role in the design of the programme is focused 
principally upon drawing up the lending instruments for the disbursement of funds to the ESM 
Member. See also Article 13(3) of the ESM Treaty. 
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perspectives on accountability work in practice in the case of the ESM. The fifth section 
summarizes the main findings and concludes. 
The understanding of the ESM’s accountability and the related assessment presented in 
this paper are primarily based upon a reading of the ESM’s legal texts and official documents, 
and secondary material produced by public bodies, academics and journalists on the ESM — 
in addition to the academic literature on accountability more generally and in relation to specific 
international, EU and national bodies. Our study also builds on the work of Transparency 
International EU, which recently cast its critical eye on the ESM’s accountability arrangements 
(Ban and Seabrooke, 2017). For our national case study of the ESM’s vertical accountability 
— in order to gain a better appreciation of ESM efforts to explain and justify its policy positions 
at the national level and national political debates over ESM policies — we conducted a 
systematic search of the German Bundestag’s online archives and the quality German press. In 
order to corroborate the understanding of ESM financial accountability developed from these 
readings, we also conducted nine semi-structured interviews with current and former ESM staff, 
ESM Board of Auditors members (who are not ESM officials but must scrutinise the procedures 
and activities of the ESM), EU institution officials, and national finance ministry and 
parliamentary officials with a specific responsibility to follow ESM activities. Because of the 
small number of officials involved, we ensure their anonymity by not naming their EU 
institution or member states.  
 
State of the art: understanding and analysing accountability in different academic 
disciplines  
Establishing robust accountability mechanisms is important for governance regimes, operating 
in the context of liberal democracy. Dawson (2015) points out the absence of adequate 
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accountability models developed specifically for the many new EU governance structures 
created during the Eurozone crisis, such as the ESM. Nevertheless, scholars working in a range 
of disciplines — and notably in comparative political science, international relations, public 
administration studies — have studied the concept of accountability extensively. We draw on 
their work to identify existing and potentially desirable future accountability mechanisms for 
the ESM. We use Lastra and Shams’s (2001) definition of accountability in financial sector 
governance as an obligation by one person (or institution) to explain and justify his / her / its 
actions or decisions against a set of criteria to another person (or institution), and to accept the 
responsibility for shortcomings. Accountability goes hand in hand with transparency, that is the 
provision of information on the decisions, their context, their rationale and their (anticipated) 
impact, as transparency ensures that the other actors have the necessary information to evaluate 
the actions of the individual or institution (de Haan and Oosterloo 2006). Transparency should 
only be limited in certain justifiable circumstances — for example, if it were harmful to market 
stability or to the legitimate interests of regulated parties (de Haan and Oosterloo 2006).  In the 
absence of clear benchmarks applicable to new Eurozone bodies, such as the ESM, our starting 
point is to use vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms, which have been discussed 
widely in the comparative politics and the international relations literature. These two 
mechanisms are particularly suitable, considering the ESM’s ‘tricky’ institutional design and 
its ‘dual institutional embeddedness’ as an international organization embedded in the EU 
governance system. Our aim is to contribute to the growing body of literature on Eurozone 
governance reforms by assessing the extent to which well-known accountability mechanisms 
apply to this important new Eurozone body. 
In the comparative politics literature, accountability is considered a cornerstone of 
legitimacy in representative democracy. It refers to the presence of robust institutional checks 
and balances and limitations on the actions of public officials to prevent the abuse of power 
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(Schedler, 1999; Przeworski et al., 1999). Two types of accountability mechanisms are 
particularly important in the domestic political arena: vertical and horizontal ones. Vertical 
accountability refers to classical hierarchical governance architectures, where tasks and 
competences are delegated, for example, by a democratically elected principal to agents. 
Principal-agent theory helps identify relevant monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms to 
ensure that the principal can exercise control over the agents and the set policy objectives are 
fully met (see, for example, Strøm, 2000; Weingast, 2003). By contrast, horizontal 
accountability refers to a system of checks and balances among different institutional bodies 
which are not linked by a hierarchical delegation of tasks but have sufficient competencies and 
resources to prevent abuse of power. Furthermore, referring to Lastra and Sham’s (2001) 
definition of accountability, governments and public officials should be able to justify and 
explain their actions to forums representing the public interest, such as parliaments and courts 
(see also Amtenbrink 1999). Courts of auditors ensure the accountability of public bodies 
through financial and performance audits which can then inform the accountability of these 
bodies to less specialized bodies, including parliaments.  
In public administration, accountability refers to a general sense of responsibility in the 
political system and willingness to act in a transparent, fair and equitable manner. Furthermore, 
scholars of public administration define accountability more concretely as a ‘social 
mechanism’, an institutional relation or arrangement in which an actor can be held to account 
by a forum (Mulgan, 2003; Bovens, 2007; Bovens et al., 2008; Bovens, 2010; Wille, 2012). As 
proposed by Bovens (2007, p. 450), accountability as a dyadic relationship ‘between an actor 
and a forum, in which the actor has the obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct’ and 
‘the forum can pose questions’. This conceptualization is particularly helpful to examine the 
relations between an organization and different potential accountability forums.  
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Furthermore, Bovens et al. (2008, p. 233) put forward the learning perspective on 
accountability, where the intended outcome of accountability is to make public authorities both 
more effective in fulfilling their mandate and more responsive to the needs and preferences of 
their key stakeholders. This is useful for our analysis of the ESM, as it adds a dynamic 
dimension of reflexivity, change and learning over time. By contrast, the vertical and horizontal 
dimensions of accountability are rather static — they concern relations between institutions in 
a democratic system that change very slowly over time. In Bovens’ (2007) own framework, 
vertical and horizontal accountability refer to relations between actors, while learning is an 
objective of what accountability should achieve. From the viewpoint of learning, accountability 
is effective when public authorities routinely generate and act upon internal and external 
feedback on their performance. Similarly, Black (2008, p. 139) points out that in polycentric 
regulatory regimes ‘the communicative activity of “rendering account” may have 
transformative effects on the organization, with implications for its ability to meet multiple 
legitimacy claims’.  
The accountability standards discussed above have been developed for and largely 
applied to the domestic political arena of liberal democracies.  At the same time, Woods (2001, 
p. 4) shows that both vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms, as conceptualized in 
comparative politics, also apply to international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, 
and WTO. Therefore, we argue that these standards are applicable to the ESM as an 
international body, but that they need to be adapted to the specific context. At the international 
level, vertical accountability rests on country representation in the organization and ability to 
shape decision-making, while horizontal accountability is more diffuse and depends on linkages 
with other entities and organizations in the international system. Woods (2001, p. 4) argues that 
accountability is higher in international organizations with balanced representation and lower 
where a few powerful member states dominate the decision-making process. In terms of 
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horizontal accountability, according to Woods (2001), in the international arena horizontal 
accountability is diffuse and is related to the drive toward more transparency, information-
sharing and responsiveness to a wider subset of stakeholders such as civil society 
representatives (Woods and Narlikar, 2003). 
The learning perspective on accountability in the public administration literature is also 
applicable to international organizations. As Kim et al. (2014) demonstrate, international 
organizations show the same set of bureaucratic traits examined by public administration 
scholars in the domestic arena. Over time, they have incorporated many management practices 
such as strategic and performance management tools originally developed for national public 
sector bodies. These practices facilitate learning from the organization’s past experience in 
order to fulfil its objectives. 
Furthermore, public administration and international relations scholars have pointed out 
that organizations are often subject to conflicting goals, drawing on examples of national public 
organizations in OECD countries, international organizations, and non-majoritarian 
independent regulators (Woods and Mattli, 2010; Koppell, 2010; Busuioc, 2009). Thus, 
multiple accountability mechanisms may apply, and may even be in conflict with each other. 
Considering the ESM’s similarity to both international organizations such as the IMF and non-
majoritarian bodies in the EU — notably the European Investment Bank (EIB) — we would 
expect to detect similar trends when evaluating how accountability works in practice. In this 
respect, the learning perspective is very important, because it can facilitate the reconciliation of 
different accountability benchmarks (see Black, 2008). Furthermore, Sabel and Zeitlin (2012) 
have shown that in EU experimentalist governance the recent turn toward conducting more 
reviews to promote reflection and learning creates a ‘recursive framework’ of governance, 
which leads to the emergence of more dynamic forms of accountability. 
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The ESM’s ‘dual institutional embeddedness’:  an international organization embedded 
in the EU governance system  
Formally, the ESM is an international financial institution established by an international treaty 
signed in 2012 by the then 17 Eurozone member states and based in Luxembourg. Its members 
and shareholders today are the 19 Eurozone member states. The ESM was established as a 
permanent mechanism to mobilize financial resources and make them available to Eurozone 
member states experiencing financial distress. The use of ESM funds to recapitalize banks 
(public and private) was later confirmed. The ESM’s total subscribed capital is €705 billion, 
made up of €80.5 billion of paid-in capital and €624.3 billion of callable capital raised by debt 
issue. The ESM’s maximum lending capacity is €500 billion. The individual member states’ 
shares in the mechanism are based on their share of capital in the ECB. Hence, the biggest ESM 
shareholders are, in order, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands, which 
collectively hold 81.5 per cent of the mechanism’s paid in capital. The ESM is authorized to 
use a variety of financial instruments such as credit lines and loans to national governments, 
and purchases of sovereign bonds on the primary and secondary markets. Furthermore, the ESM 
can carry out the direct or indirect recapitalization of financial institutions within a member 
state if Eurozone financial stability is at risk and the member state is not in a position to carry 
out a recapitalization measure on its own.  
Legally, the ESM is an international financial institution. However, its governance 
structure and decision-making procedures illustrate its embeddedness in the Eurozone 
governance architecture. To begin with, the ESM’s Board of Governors is comprised of the 
Eurozone finance ministers. This body takes major decisions including:  granting or 
withholding financial assistance; determining the conditions with which aid recipients must 
comply; and setting the financial instruments to be deployed (Article 5, ESM Treaty). Decision-
making takes place on an intergovernmental basis, with each national finance minister 
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possessing either one vote or (on matters concerning ESM capital) a vote weighted according 
to the capital contribution of his/her member state. Most decisions require unanimity, while 
decisions on capital require a majority of weighted votes. Emergency decisions are made by a 
qualified majority of 85 per cent of voting members. In addition to the Board of Governors, the 
ESM has a Board of Directors in charge of the organization’s day-to-day operations (Article 6, 
ESM Treaty). This operational management body is also composed of one representative from 
each Eurozone member state. These ESM structures confirm Dawson’s (2015, p. 981) 
conclusion that ‘many of the decision-making structures of post-crisis EU governance — from 
voting in the ESM to the role of the European Council under the European Semester — operate 
on a strongly inter-governmental basis’. 
Eurozone member state governments in need of financial assistance submit an application 
to the Chair of the ESM Board of Governors (Article 13, ESM Treaty). Once such a request has 
been received, it is assessed by two EU institutions:  the European Commission and the ECB. 
In addition, the IMF is consulted (see Figure 1). The three institutions, informally known as the 
Troika, are also in charge of monitoring compliance with the economic and financial conditions 
attached to receiving financial assistance. Even though the ESM is not formally part of the EU 
institutional architecture, it interacts closely with other EU institutions — notably, the 
Commission and the ECB but also the informal Eurogroup and, through this, ECOFIN. ESM 
decision-making relies upon Commission and ECB advice. Furthermore, the informational 
linkages and interdependence between the ESM and the EU institutions are evident when we 
consider that the EU commissioner in charge of Economic and Monetary Affairs and the 
president of the ECB may participate in the meetings of the ESM Board of Governors as 
observers. On 14 November 2018, the ESM and the Commission produced a Joint Position on 
future cooperation between the two institutions as ‘joint input’ for the December Euro Summit 
(Commission and ESM, 2018). Officially, the Position was agreed in order to clarify the 
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respective roles of the ESM and Commission on a number of financial assistance elements and 
on building cooperation outside financial assistance. 
 
[PLACE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Assessing accountability in practice in the case of the ESM 
The ESM’s idiosyncratic ‘dual institutional embeddedness’ is largely due to the crisis-driven 
design of this body in 2012 and the refusal of certain EU member states to accept Treaty reform 
in order to create it (Hodson, 2013). Given the substantial lending capacity of the ESM and the 
politicisation of the financial stabilisation programmes managed by the European Commission 
(Dawson, 2015; Moschella, 2017), it is all the more important to ensure that appropriate 
accountability mechanisms are in place to guarantee the effective scrutiny of the ESM. At the 
international level, a close comparative case is the IMF, established to help stabilize countries 
with balance of payments problems (Woods, 2001). At the EU level, a comparative case is the 
EIB which, like the ESM, is a public financial institution with a mandate to lend, albeit in very 
different circumstances and with distinct objectives. 
Vertical accountability is operationalized in terms of examining the extent to which 
member states participating in the ESM and, specifically, national parliaments seek to monitor 
and control closely the operations of the mechanism. Horizontal accountability is 
operationalized by evaluating the checks and balances between the ESM and other bodies in 
the EU governance system, even though the ESM is not formally part of the EU governance 
architecture. Lastly, the learning perspective is operationalized by assessing the ESM’s internal 
code of conduct, recommendations by the organization’s Board of Auditors, any commissioned 
internal and external evaluations, and how these are used by the organization in order to reflect 
upon and improve its operation over time.  
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Overall, Bovens et al. (2008, p. 225) underscore the importance of strengthening existing 
public accountability arrangements and designing new ones in order to keep up with the creation 
of new governance frameworks and instruments. The growing literature on this subject has 
identified both accountability ‘deficits’ and ‘overloads’; finding a middle ground remains a 
concern. Below we present a set of initial conclusions, drawn by examining the ESM through 
the lens of vertical, horizontal and learning accountability. This assessment takes into account 
the ESM’s idiosyncratic ‘dual institutional embeddedness’. 
 
Vertical accountability 
In terms of vertical accountability, the member states participating in the ESM will seek to 
monitor and control closely the operations of the mechanism. Drawing on research on the IMF, 
we would expect the mechanism’s biggest shareholders to hold key positions in the 
mechanism’s governing bodies and exert the most influence in ESM decision-making (Woods, 
2001; Woodward, 2007; Johnson, 2011). The establishment of weighted voting rights on ESM 
decisions on capital most clearly reflects the preferences of the mechanism’s biggest 
shareholders. More controversially, it might be argued that the selection of Klaus Regling, a 
German national, as the first ESM Managing Director and Chairperson of the Board of 
Directors, reflects German preferences (former ESM BoA member, interview, 9 April 2017). 
Furthermore, one of the first five members of the ESM’s Board of Auditors (BoA) was a 
representative of The German Federal Audit Office which — according to the first European 
Court of Auditors nominee to the BoA (also a German national) — was ‘probably’ more than 
just a coincidence and ‘probably because Germany’s interests in the ESM are indeed very great’ 
(Carotti, 2012).   
The interest of national public institutions in ESM capital raising and lending activities to 
programme countries is most likely to be considerable in creditor Eurozone member states with 
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fewer financial difficulties. Three of these are also among the member states where the national 
parliament has the legal power to vote on ESM capital raising and lending:  Germany, the 
Netherlands and Finland. It is perhaps not surprising then that the parliaments, courts of audit 
and other public entities of these three countries have been among the most active in 
scrutinizing ESM activities. For example, in its opinion on the ESM Treaty, The German 
Federal Audit Office was seen as particularly well informed on ESM matters having gained 
relevant experience from the years during which it was responsible for auditing the International 
Monetary Fund (Noack quoted in Carotti, 2012). Widespread German, Dutch and Finnish 
opposition to the development of a Eurozone ‘transfer union’ heighten political interest in ESM 
activities. 
The finance ministers of the Eurozone member states can be held to account by their 
national parliament for their country’s individual share in the ESM, but not for the functioning 
of the ESM as a whole or the country programmes that it has funded. There is a complete 
absence in the intergovernmental treaty of any mention of a role for national parliaments with 
regard to the operation of the ESM. Their absence is surprising given the important role 
assigned to parliaments in national liberal democracies and in the European Union on fiscal 
policy matters (Armstrong, 2013; Moschella, 2017). However, national constitutional 
requirements require four Eurozone member state governments to seek the approval of the 
national parliament on all ESM capital raising, lending, bond buying and on each modification 
to ESM loan packages — these are Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, and Estonia (Hoeing, 
2015, p. 50-51). The Austrian parliament has voting power on each ESM capital raising and 
loan package / bond buying but no voting power on modifications. The Italian and French 
governments are required by law only to inform the parliament on these matters. The 
parliaments in the other eleven Eurozone member states have no voting power or any legal 
guarantee of being informed. A German Constitutional Court ruling of 18 March 2014, further 
15	
	
clarified that the German government would have to obtain the approval of the German 
Bundestag on any increase to Germany’s capital contribution to the ESM — beyond the €190 
billion already allowed for. The Constitutional Court ruled that the Bundestag ‘may not 
relinquish its right to decide on the budget, not even in a system of intergovernmental 
governance’ (BVerfG 2014; see also Financial Times, 18 March 2014). The ruling notes: 
The treaty grants the bodies of the European Union no powers which affect the 
overall budgetary responsibility of the German Bundestag [nor does it] force the 
Federal Republic of Germany to make a permanent commitment regarding its 
economic policy that can no longer be reversed (BVerfG 2014). 
  
While there is no formal obligation for the ESM to be accountable to Eurozone member 
state parliaments, in practice, ESM officials have been responsive to the demand for more 
engagement with national parliaments (interview, ESM official 15 June 2018; Regling, 2017). 
Moreover, Harald Noack, the first European Court of Auditors member of the ESM Board of 
Auditors claimed that he would make himself ‘available to interested members of the national 
authorities of states … as long as this [was] compatible with [his] duties as a member of the 
Board’ (Carotti, 2012). Klaus Regling and a number of ESM officials regularly visit national 
finance ministries and national parliaments (interview ESM official, 15 June 2018) and while 
the ESM does not yet publish a report cataloguing its engagement with national authorities, 
videos of a number of national parliamentary visits are posted online and national parliamentary 
archives provide minutes of public hearings. This voluntary effort directed at national 
parliaments resonates with Bovens and Curtin’s (2016) analysis of the drive toward greater 
political accountability in Eurozone governance. They find that ECB President Draghi’s 
accountability to national parliaments has become stronger and more visible over time, even 
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though there are no explicit legal obligations that compel him to engage with member states’ 
national parliaments (Bovens and Curtin, 2016, p. 19). 
Nevertheless, there are significant differences in the frequency and level of informed 
debate about the ESM in different national parliaments. A review of parliamentary archives 
showed that more active parliaments, such as those of the Netherlands, Germany, Finland and 
Austria frequently organise committee sessions where the ESM is discussed. These parliaments 
also request more information from their respective governments about their position on the 
ESM ahead of important EU summits, such as the European Council meeting in December 2017 
when the future of the ESM and its possible transformation into a European Monetary Fund 
was discussed (Netherlands Parliament, 2017; European Council, 2017).  
To take the example of the German parliament, we find that ESM matters were voted 
upon and / or debated eighteen times in Bundestag plenary hearings since 2012 to end June 
2018 (see Table 1; see also Meiers, 2015, pp. 38-39; Ketterer, 2016). During the same six-year 
period, the Bundestag budget committee dedicated roughly three dozen public meetings in 
whole or in large part to ESM matters, prepared reports, issued statements / opinions and 
questioned German finance ministry and ESM officials, including Klaus Regling (as on 6 
October 2014). In addition to these public meetings, there were closed door meetings of a 
special Bundestag committee on the ESM, created in 2014, the membership of which is voted 
by the Bundestag plenary (interview, Bundestag finance committee staff member, 7 June 2018; 
see also Bundestag 2014). The creation of this committee reflected Bundestag efforts to ensure 
greater scrutiny of ESM activities and improved ESM accountability by tackling the — often 
repeated — argument that ESM transparency was necessarily limited because of its market-
sensitive policies and the fear that transparency on some matters would undermine euro area 
stability. Meeting in camera allows this committee to discuss the full range of sensitive ESM 
matters and engage in more open discussions with ESM officials than would be the case in 
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public fora. German party groups also met with ESM staff over the first six years of the ESM’s 
operation — as in June 2018, when Klaus Regling met with the CDU-CSU Group in the 
Bundestag (Handelsblatt, 5 June 2018). 
 
Table 1. Bundestag plenary interventions on ESM matters, 2012-2018 
Votes (preceded 
by debates) 
2012: establishment of the ESM; change of Greek programme. 
2013: Cyprus (Financial assistance ESM), Portugal and Ireland (both 
extension of EFSF loans for seven years). 
2014: members of special committee on ESM; premature repayment 
of loans by Ireland; change of federal law on financing of ESM, on 
financial assistance instruments as well as on implementing regulation 
on Bank recapitalization; financial assistance for Greece. 
2015: financial assistance for Greece; granting in principle financial 
loans to Greece; granting financial loans to Greece. 
2017: on premature repayment of loans by Portugal; premature 
repayment of loans by Ireland. 
2018: financial assistance for Greece. 
Debates (only) 2014:  change of federal law on financing of ESM and on financial 
assistance instruments; Government demand of decision of Bundestag 
on implementing regulation on bank recapitalization by the ESM. 
2015: on situation in Greece after financial assistance. 
2016: savings due to lower interest rates and costs of Greek crisis. 
2018: position of government coalition regarding European 
Commission proposal of transforming ESM to EMF. 
Questions and 
motions 
2014:  Approval by the Federal Government on support programmes 
for Eurozone countries in the framework of the ESM. 
2017: consequences of potential non-participation of IMF in current 
financial assistance programme for Greece 
2018: several questions and motions by political parties on the 
establishment of European Monetary Fund; Potential future financial 
assistance for Greece; EMF outside or inside of EU law; ESM and 
Greece. 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation from Bundestag archives 
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Another important example of the increase in the ESM’s dialogue with national 
parliaments concerns a new body, the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic 
Coordination and Governance in the European Union (SECG). This body was set up in 2013 
by the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(Article 13) and meets at least twice a year to ensure greater accountability in the area of EU 
economic governance and budgetary policy by involving all EU national parliaments in debates 
on these matters. The Interparliamentary Conference also serves as a platform where national 
parliaments can engage in regular direct exchanges with the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and other relevant EU institutions and bodies. As an international 
organization, the ESM is outside the formal EU framework and is not obliged to answer 
questions at forums such as the Interparliamentary Conference. However, due to its importance 
for the Eurozone, the ESM was put on the agenda of the SECG meetings by the EU Presidencies 
of Luxembourg in 2015, the Netherlands in 2016, Estonia in 2017 and Austria in 2018 (EU 
Interparliamentary Exchange, 2018).   
 
Horizontal accountability 
Horizontal accountability refers to checks and balances among the ESM and EU institutions 
and bodies involved in economic governance. Horizontal accountability encompasses the 
interactions between the ESM and the European Commission and the ECB, which provide 
important input to the ESM’s decision-making. These bodies, and specifically, their advisory 
role in deciding upon ESM decisions on capital raising, lending and conditionality are subject 
to European Parliament and European Court of Auditors scrutiny — the former in terms of 
parliamentary questions, interviews and reports; the latter in terms of performance audits. In 
the EU context, ESM officials hold up the accountability arrangements of the EIB as a potential 
model for the ESM — in the event that the ESM is eventually brought into the EU (ESM 
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officials, interviews 7 February 2017 and 23 March 2017, 15 June 2018). EIB capital raising 
and lending activities, in addition to the specifics of lending programmes, are subject to 
European Parliament scrutiny and to annual financial and performance audits undertaken by the 
Court of Auditors.  
Overall, EU level democratic control and public scrutiny apply to the ESM only to a very 
limited extent. The ESM Treaty assigns the European Parliament no role regarding the ESM 
and the European Court of Auditors no audit right of its own. Only indirect oversight 
mechanisms are assigned to the European Parliament under Regulation 472/2013. During the 
enhanced surveillance of a member state or an on-going macroeconomic adjustment 
programme linked to EU financial assistance, the competent committee of the European 
Parliament may invite representatives of the Commission, the ECB and IMF to participate in 
economic dialogue. Furthermore, the Commission regularly informs the Chair and Vice-Chairs 
of the relevant European Parliament committee — orally and confidentially — of the 
conclusions drawn from the preparation and monitoring of member states’ macroeconomic 
adjustment programmes. The current role of the European Court of Auditors regarding the work 
of the ESM is also very limited. Nonetheless, the Court of Auditors performs an indirect role 
by auditing the structural adjustment reforms undertaken by countries receiving ESM loans, 
and the role of the Commission and the ECB in implementing these reforms. The potential role 
of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in ensuring the accountability of the ESM is also very 
limited. The ESM Board of Governors is responsible for the interpretation of the 
intergovernmental treaty and its application. Thus, the Board of Governors has the power to 
decide on any conflict between or among ESM member states and between ESM member states 
and the ESM itself (Rochas, 2013). However, an ESM member state can appeal a decision of 
the Board of Governors to the CJEU (Article 37(3), ESM Treaty). 
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Learning perspective  
The learning perspective on accountability refers to designing robust codes of conduct, internal 
and external evaluations, and how these are used by an organization to learn and improve its 
operation over time. In this respect, the ESM has developed both a code of conduct and an 
auditing architecture to examine its operations. The statutory audit of the ESM is performed by 
the external auditors and the Board of Auditors (BoA) may conduct performance audits of the 
regularity, compliance, performance and risk management of the ESM in accordance with 
international auditing standards (Article 30 (3) Treaty, 24 (4) By-Laws). The BoA has five 
members — formally appointed by the ESM Board of Governors — two of whom are 
nominated by the public audit bodies of the 19 Eurozone member states, two by the ESM 
Chairperson, and the remaining member by the European Court of Auditors, who serves in an 
ad personam capacity. The BoA’s mandate, composition and procedures are laid down in part 
in the ESM treaty. BoA members (interview 9 April 2017; Carotti, 2012) argue in favour of the 
credibility and efficacity of their audits. The set of ESM by-laws include further agreements 
about the range of activities in which the BoA can engage and its reporting requirements. 
The Board of Auditors is just one of three bodies in the oversight structure of the ESM; 
the two others being the internal ESM audit department and the organization selected to conduct 
the ESM’s external financial audit — normally one of the Big Four audit firms, each with a 
significant presence in Luxembourg. Nevertheless, the BoA is the only body that can give an 
independent assessment of the actual outcomes of the support programmes funded by the ESM. 
It has full access to all ESM documents and reports (Accountant.nl, 2015; Court of Audit of the 
Netherlands, 2012). As the ESM’s Managing Director, Klaus Regling, has pointed out, ‘the 
Board of Auditors is an important counterpart to the ESM management. It plays an important 
role in our corporate governance and guarantees the trust of our shareholders and the general 
public’ (interviewed in Accountant.nl, 2015).  
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The ESM has also been responsive to the demands of Eurozone member states for greater 
transparency of its decision-making. For example, in 2012 the Dutch Court of Audit (2012), 
amongst others, pressed for two points to be included in the ESM by-laws. First, it demanded a 
broad audit mandate of all support programmes funded by the ESM in accordance with 
international audit standards. Second, it asked for a more extensive reporting on the ESM’s 
activities than stipulated in the ESM Treaty. For the first five years of the ESM’s operation, the 
only ESM BoA information provided publicly was found in a statement by the BoA on the last 
page of the ESM Annual Reports, confirming the legality and regularity of the ESM’s 
operations during the year (see ESM Annual Reports, 2012-2016). The Dutch Court of Auditors 
called for the ESM BoA’s annual report to be made available to national parliaments (Court of 
Audit of the Netherlands, 2012). In 2016, the ESM made the necessary amendments to its by-
laws to meet these two requests. The ESM BoA’s Report in Respect of the Financial Statements 
and Annual Report, which summarises the Board’s audit work and recommendations for the 
respective year and is prepared for the ESM’s Board of Governors, were made publicly 
available. 
Regarding the need for a broad audit for ESM-funded support programmes, in June 2016, 
the ESM Board of Governors (thus Eurozone finance ministers) decided to commission the first 
ever independent evaluation of the role of the ESM (and EFSF) in financial assistance 
programmes. The Board of Governors agreed the appointment of the Austrian former ECB 
Executive Board member, Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, to undertake the evaluation. In agreeing 
the evaluation, the Board of Governors explicitly noted its inspiration from other international 
financial institutions, including the IMF and World Bank (ESM 2017). The evaluation assessed 
the relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency of ESM (and EFSF) financial assistance in 
safeguarding the financial stability of the Eurozone and of its member states. The evaluation 
was complementary to previous evaluations of these programmes undertaken by the IMF’s 
22	
	
Independent Evaluation Office, the European Court of Auditors, and the European Commission 
— with greater focus on ESM involvement. The evaluation — presented in mid-June 2017 — 
praised the ESM and EFSF for their contribution to safeguarding Eurozone financial stability 
but called for further improvements (Strupczewksi, 2017). 
While little is known about the internal decision-making dynamics of the ESM, its 2015 
Annual Report, stresses that ‘as a publicly funded international institution, the ESM has also 
moved unilaterally to enhance the transparency of its decision making’ (ESM, 2015, p. 83; ESM 
officials, interview, 15 June 2018). ESM officials interviewed accept the desirability of the 
improved reporting on and transparency of the ESM’s activities both to other bodies and to the 
wider public (interviews 7 February 2017; 23 March 2017). However, they also stressed the 
importance of limiting public transparency on information that could be deemed to be market 
sensitive. The ESM releases on its website key documents adopted by its two governing bodies 
on the programme countries. In spring 2016, the ESM made a commitment to publish more 
details about the country loan programmes discussed in the ESM Board of Governors, the ESM 
Board of Directors and the Eurogroup. This ESM transparency initiative was introduced in 
parallel with a similar move in the Eurogroup. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that two forms of accountability — vertical and horizontal — and the 
learning perspective on accountability are particularly relevant for understanding the ESM’s 
accountability, based on reviewing established benchmarks in the comparative politics, 
international relations and public administration literatures. The bulk of the perceived 
inadequacy of the ESM’s current accountability arrangements is attributed to its unique 
institutional design, a point confirmed in most of the interviews undertaken for this study. 
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 The ESM’s vertical accountability remains limited although the supply of information 
to national finance ministers and ministries and through them to national parliaments ensures 
some accountability. Vertical accountability is further reinforced in the five Eurozone member 
states that grant the national parliament voting powers on ESM capital raising and lending. 
While there is no formal obligation for the ESM to be accountable to and engage with Eurozone 
member state parliaments, in practice, the mechanism has been responsive to the demand for 
more engagement with national parliaments. ESM officials have been willing to provide more 
information about the ESM’s activities and answer questions from parliamentarians. Concerns 
about the provision of market-sensitive information have been partially overcome in the 
German case through the creation of a special parliamentary committee on the ESM that meets 
in camera.  
Horizontal accountability has only been marginally improved since the creation of the 
ESM. The kind of scrutiny and audit to which the EIB is subject — by the European Parliament 
and the European Court of Auditors — is currently absent, given the legal status of the ESM 
outside the EU institutional framework. The leadership of the EU institutions argues that this is 
problematic:  the Five Presidents’ Report (2015, p. 18) emphasizes that the ESM’s ‘governance 
should … be fully integrated within the EU Treaties’ to ensure an effective Eurozone crisis 
management framework. The transformation of the ESM into an EU body also features on the 
Commission’s (2018) list of ten policy priorities for the period 2015-2019. In its Joint Position 
with the Commission of November 2018, the ESM states clearly its preference to become part 
of the EU legal framework (Commission and ESM, 2018). However, this transformation of the 
ESM — or a future EMF — is unlikely in the near future given German (and other) government 
opposition (Financial Times, 3 June 2018). Unilateral ESM action to improve its engagement 
with the European Parliament remains nonetheless legally possible — a point made publicly by 
Klaus Regling (2017). 
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Under the learning perspective, the ESM’s Board of Auditors ensures a level of scrutiny 
of ESM activities that is then — in part — made available to other institutions and the wider 
public. The move in June 2016 to commission an external evaluation of the ESM’s participation 
was directly inspired by IMF and World Bank practice. The critical evaluation of June 2017 — 
and the range of recommendations to improve the ESM’s involvement in programmes and 
disbursement of funds — suggests the objectivity of this report and its potential effectiveness 
in ensuring greater accountability.  
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Appendix 
Figure 1. The operation of the ESM in relation to EU institutions and the IMF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  German Federal Finance Ministry (2014) 
 
ESM member asks Chair of ESM Board of 
Governors to activate stability support 
COM & ECB investigate whether financial 
stability is at risk 
COM, ECB & IMF analyse debt 
sustainability 
 
COM, ECB, IMF assess 
financing needs 
ESM Board of Governors makes decision on 
principal granting of financial assistance 
ESM Board of Governors makes 
unanimous decision on 
disembursement of further tranches 
COM, ECB & IMF monitor compliance 
with economic policy conditions 
Activation of stability 
assistance 
COM signs adjustment 
programmes in the name of 
the ESM 
ESM Board of Governors 
approves adjustment 
programme and financial 
assistance agreement 
Managing Director of the ESM drafts 
financial assistance agreement 
COM, ECB, IMF negotiate macroeconomic 
adjustment programme, including conditions 
